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Adjusting 
power between 
the State and 
the market 
Davidlbarra* 
The models that dominated economic science and policy in 
the first three decades of the post-war period have broken 
down and there are no consummate replacements. The 
outlook seems to be conservative. The late 1970s turned 
back the clock which was moving for two centuries in the 
direction of morally justifying State intervention intended to 
moderate or correct the social inequalities produced by 
market operations. Part I of this article explores these 
trends. 
Today exceptional importance is given to economic 
efficiency and to liberalizing competition as a disciplinary 
incentive for producers and even for countries acquiring 
worldwide markets. Part II deals with these issues and part 
III examines, from the experience of the first world, how 
the Keynesian model is in decline. 
Since the third-world nations do not usually produce 
universally accepted theses, changes in the models and 
ideologies of the North have to be assimilated a fortiori 
sooner or later. This normally generates discord of great 
Importance between the dominant foreign doctrines and the 
reality of third-world countries. Part IV takes up this 
subject. 
The clearest expressions of contemporary solutions 
for age-old tensions between the market and the State are 
found in the processes of opening to the exterior and 
privatization or deregulation. Parts V and VI study these 
questions. 
The final part seeks to identify the justified demands 
for change in the styles of State intervention, with special 
reference to Latin America. Finally, some general 
conclusions are drawn. 
•Economic Consultant to the Subregional 
Headquarters of ECLAC in Mexico. He served as the 
Mexican Government's Minister of Finance and Public 
Credit. 
The author is grateful for the comments of José 
Alberro and Horacio Labastlda, and for the able assistance 
of Teresa Duran. 
I 
The upward trend of State 
intervention 
Explaining the ebb and flow of the theory, practice 
and ideology underlying the models of economic 
policy calls for a reference to history. 
Modern institutions of production began by 
establishing liberalism as a form of economic 
organization. The British industrial revolution and 
Adam Smith created, explained and upgraded the 
market to the rank of supreme coordinator of the 
actions of the myriad of producers, intermediaries and 
consumers. 
This gave rise to a sharp divide between the 
domain of politics and the domain of economics. For 
the first time economic power was privatized and a 
dichotomy arose between the State and the market, 
between private law and public law, between 
efficiency and equality. Hitherto, the social standing 
of each individual determined his position in 
production and economic power and political power 
were thus always united. For that reason, the State as 
a social institution was quite older than the market. 
The ideological justification for this first and 
enormous truncation of the State's traditional power 
was the need to counterbalance despotism and the 
arbitrary passions of rulers (Hirschman, 1981). The 
political justification was the need to incorporate 
peacefully within the élite the nascent entrepreneurial 
groups; and the economic justification was the need 
to reorganize production and its institutions on 
foundations more consistent with the technological 
and institutional progress of the time. 
From then on the pendulum began to swing in 
the opposite direction. Economic models, ideologies 
and especially social pressures led the State to 
recover some of its lost ground as a governing power. 
The unrestricted functioning of the market, although 
it facilitated capital formation and efficient 
production, rewarded only the winners of the 
competition. By so doing, it created social 
inequalities that were unsustainable over the long 
term and later proliferated . monopolistic or 
oligopolistic forms of production which nullified 
many of the virtues of the classical model of 
competition. It gradually became clear that the 
market, with its unequal relations in the division of 
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labour and its formal equality among trading partners, 
was intrinsically unable to provide distributive equity 
(Bobbio, 1978). The idea of economic justice arose 
precisely at that time, advocating that ethical 
principles and the norms of social coexistence should 
prevail and regulate the market operations 
(Macpherson, 1987).1 
With all its advantages, the economic 
organization of the market conceals the issues of the 
distribution of income and wealth and relegates them 
to a secondary level, giving primary emphasis to 
growth and accumulation. Thus, one of the key issues 
of any society does not receive due attention: the 
establishment of a community with goals not only for 
production, but also and inevitably, for distribution. 
A free market leads to a concentration of 
economic power which becomes political power. For 
that reason, economic freedom ends up opposing the 
political equality and freedom increasingly demanded 
by social movements throughout the world. The 
dichotomy between private interest and public 
interest becomes obvious, especially during the 
phases of depression in the economic cycle, with their 
burden of social sacrifices which the market is 
incapable of correcting. 
The market and democracy are disparate 
institutions; inspired by different values, they tug 
society in directions at times complementary, at other 
times the opposite, but always different. Thus when 
dynamic tension threatens to tear the social fabric 
apart, political accommodations are usually made 
which bring into harmony -not logically but by 
consensus or imposition- goals as dissimilar as those 
of awarding the efficiency of the few while pursuing 
the equality of all (Ibarra, 1987). 
Strictly speaking, however, limits have always been placed 
on the legitimate action of the market, preventing It from being 
the only way for allocating resources, rewards or punishment. 
Transactions exist which are precluded from the changing sphere of 
commerce. Bribery, selling votes or government jobs, and simony 
violate the social rule that puts them outside the jurisdiction of the 
market. 
There are even important conceptual differences in the 
content they give to the term "freedom". Democracy understands 
freedom to be the capacity of a society's members to set norms 
for themselves with full autonomy. For the market, on the contrary, 
freedom means enjoying a sphere of action without State control. 
Consequently, the "liberal State" Is where government interference 
is limited to a bare minimum. And the "democratic State" is 
where the organs of self-government are numerous (Bobbio, 1985, 
p. 197). 
From the time of the British industrial revolution 
until slightly more than a decade ago, those 
axiological oppositions gave rise to a succession of 
reforms, all having as the common denominator an 
increase in State intervention and in legal norms so as 
to correct or compensate for the socially polarizing 
effects of the market. 
Likewise, democracy, in its modern sense of 
granting equal rights to the whole population, is the 
result and the guarantee of the social struggle for 
equality, by attenuating the disparities resulting from 
the inevitable Darwinism of the economic 
organization of the market. The advanced Western 
countries were first organized as liberal societies and 
only very much later as democratic societies. Indeed, 
universal suffrage and civil rights for the whole 
population is a recent phenomenon. Previously the 
electorate consisted of privileged exclusive groups, to 
whom Governments had to answer for their 
administration. 
For almost two centuries the evolution of labour 
legislation and controls over private activity or public 
expenditures faithfully reflected the results of the 
confrontation between the logic of the market and the 
logic of democracy. The public sectors of the 
different countries grew pari passu with the increase 
of the State's responsibilities in economic life, i.e., 
with repoliticization of the economy. Controls and 
protective labour laws, progressive taxes, antitrust 
provisions and the welfare State's complex of 
institutions were all established in response to the 
inequalities of distribution arising from free markets. 
Later, maintaining external equilibrium, the fight 
against inflation, anti-cyclical stabilization and the 
goal of full employment led the State to assume the 
function of administering the economy within stable 
paths of prosperity. 
Reflecting the cultural and ideological climate 
dominant in the world during a good part of the 
present century, the developing nations followed 
interventionist trends. They added, however, a new 
dimension -this time taken from the planning 
experience of the socialist countries and the countries 
who rebuilt after the Second World War II-
deliberate government involvement in production in 
order to overcome backwardness and poverty. That 
made an important difference: instead of placing 
controls on private activity or creating social-welfare 
institutions, public intervention in Latin America was 
guided, in almost all cases, into starting up directly 
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productive enterprises. More than a welfare State, 
there was a State concerned with encouraging, but 
also replacing normally weak private entrepreneurs. 
It is not surprising, then, that public expenditure 
during the present century rose from 10% to 40-60% 
of the domestic product of the industrialized nations 
and reached the range of 30-50% in the Latin 
American countries. Long gone were the days when 
Governments accepted no responsibility whatsoever 
for the lot of the poor, for compensating for the 
economic cycle, for generating growth, when material 
wealth was socially admired rather than resented 
(DeJasay, 1985). The State became the locus where 
On the level of ideas, economic liberalism, soon after 
it became the dominant model, had to face criticism, 
resist dissident doctrines and assimilate reforms 
dictated by the change of events or the evolution of 
theoretical thought. 
Economists cannot claim to be innocent of 
participation in the turmoil of concepts concerning 
the roles of the State and the market. Leaving out 
schismatics and backsliders, the dominant ideological 
currents greatly influenced tremendous changes in 
public opinion. Analysis of the market's defects, 
monopoly, unfair competition and later, non-
essentials, technically justified a broad range of 
government regulations. In the macroeconomic 
sector, the elimination of chronic unemployment, 
compounded fluctuations, or price and exchange-rate 
volatility removed any scruples about State 
management of the economy. In some cases the 
contribution of economic thought was a critique of 
market functioning -with proposed remedies; in other 
cases, ideological currents that had already become 
strong in political theses and practices were simply 
incorporated. 
Today the critique is at the other extreme. 
Economists have stopped pointing out the faults of 
the market in order to dedicate themselves to 
identifying the faults of State intervention. They have 
been equally successful in this new terrain. 
Bureaucratism and bureaucratic power, excessive 
regulation, the lack of initiative, waste, welfare-State 
paternalism, abusive tax burdens, and the 
proliferation of parastatal enterprises are some of the 
the demands frequently found in different interest 
groups were not only settled but also met, and where 
the balance between the values of democracy and the 
market had to be determined. 
The interventionist cycle -or the cycle of market 
regression- did not come to an end until the last 
decade, when formulations that had been brewing for 
a long time in some countries of the first world sprang 
to the fore and when many Latin American countries, 
having reached intermediate levels of industrial 
progress, were witnessing increasingly more serious 
struggles between stronger entrepreneurial classes 
and the traditional instigator State. 
issues that have awakened the interest of economic 
scientists. 
Once more the third world is following those 
trends in their dual aspect of economic doctrine and 
political ideology. The reason is simple: those nations 
do not, on their own, usually generate formulations 
with an appreciable degree of universality. The 
phenomenon of dependence is more patent in 
cultural, scientific and technical subordination than in 
economic relations, and a state of development is not 
always congruent with sociopolitical models, which 
usually unite or "harmonize", without vast gaps, the 
reality and culture of advanced countries. 
For all the correspondence existing between 
world ideological movements and the specific 
circumstances of the third world, there is always 
some historical inconsistency. It is true that the ideas 
of political and economic liberalism gave enormous 
impetus to the modernization of Latin American 
societies in the last century. But it is also certain that 
they helped to accentuate or leave aside some very 
important socio-economic problems, such as the 
concentration of land or genuine democratization of 
governmental systems. 
There was no flagrant inconsistency between the 
conditions in Latin America and the Keynesian 
model; actually they were rather complementary. 
Without fully reintegrating the economy into the 
domain of politics, the idea of placing the 
management of large economic complexes under 
public tutelage made it possible to form a social 
consensus that brought widespread benefits with it. 
II 
Economic models 
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The State took over part of the role of the "invisible 
hand" in trying to resolve the cycles of prosperity and 
depression which escaped the powers of the market. 
Workers and the middle class benefited from 
guaranteed full employment in the present and greater 
future participation in the benefits of material 
progress. The stability of demand supported the 
generation of profits and multiplied the investment 
opportunities of private enterprise (Ibarra, 1987). 
More than 30 years of world prosperity after the 
Second World War bear testimony to the efficacy of 
the Keynesian political consensus. Under its aegis the 
goal of full employment in the advanced countries 
could become, with no ideological contradiction, the 
growth objective of the third world, initiated and 
given impetus by State intervention. Thus Latin 
America undertook changes of tremendous 
magnitude, promoting industrialization, encouraging 
urbanization or forming middle-class strata. 
Moreover, the sustained expansion of world markets 
benefited Latin American foreign trade with unusual 
intensity, in spite of the import-substitution strategies. 
Prosperity, however, had its costs and gave rise 
to new problems. Note how the banner of 
employment and growth, precisely because of their 
efficiency in harmonizing interests and concentrating 
social energies into a small group of issues, 
elim inated the reformist nucleus of democratic 
thought from public debate and the action of political 
parties. Indeed, by making economic development the 
central objective of the State's action and by 
becoming its main source of legitimation, the 
modernization of political systems was ignored. Thus, 
with very few exceptions, during the period of the 
greatest economic boom the three decades following 
the Second World War authoritarianism, coups d'état, 
the violation of human and civil rights were all 
frequent symptoms of a prolonged political crisis still 
in search of a stable solution in Latin America. 
The Keynesian arrangement began to fall apart in 
the 1970s, owing to a complex combination of causes 
-which we can only briefly outline here- in the 
industrial countries. Fiscal equilibria broke down 
under the triple onslaught of the demands of the 
welfare State, support for private capital formation, 
and military expenditures. The rise of new industrial 
centres exacerbated worldwide market competition, 
transnationalized production and intensified 
technological change. Resources for meeting 
commitments to social justice began to thin out, 
owing to the community's resistance to tax increases, 
and the fact that they had to compete with demands of 
higher political priority: military expenditures and 
those related to remaining in the vanguard of 
international economic competition. Moreover, where 
it was still in effect, the out-of-date post-war model 
made the inflationary and payment imbalances even 
worse, as happened in the United States when it tried 
to finance simultaneously the war in Vietnam and 
President Johnson's Great Society project. 
Anglo-Saxon political analysis of those same 
phenomena emphasizes the presence of inflationary 
expectations, fed by the mass media, political parties 
and the proliferation of interest groups. Social 
demands mounting at an explosive rate outstripped 
the economic and administrative capacity of the State. 
That, along with the influence of intellectuals 
-creators of an adversary culture- weakened the 
popular will to obey or made societies more and more 
ungovernable (Steinfels, 1979; Crozier et al.y 1975; 
Bell, 1976). 
Faced with these changed circumstances and 
attitudes, a new model gradually took shape, with 
values shared by neo-liberals and neo-conservatives, 
based on many of the following theses. 
a) Strengthening the market as the proper 
mechanism for allocating resources efficiently and for 
absorbing the activities that overwhelm State 
administration. To the extent that it ceases to 
participate or intervene in the economy, the State will 
be able to elude more easily the demands of different 
interest groups which jeopardize the political 
legitimacy of the State when their demands are heard 
less and less. Where excessive demands doom many 
government programmes to failure, the public 
authorities should protect themselves by dispersing 
the responsibility for deficiencies as much as possible 
(Steinfels, 1974, p. 64). 
b) Defending the traditional principle of equal 
opportunities, but rejecting the equalization of social 
or economic conditions (of income or results) as 
dangerous for freedom. The welfare State is not 
repudiated entirely, but it is restricted to providing 
services and security with a minimum of interference 
in private affairs, and to not ruining the incentives for 
investment and work. The past expansion of public 
activity is proof not of a Government's strength but 
rather of its and the political leaders' weakness in not 
rejecting irrelevant demands from different social 
groups (Crozier, 1975, p. 164; Kristol, 1981). 
c) The rescheduling of social priorities in the 
agenda of government action: in the economic sector, 
employment or growth loses ground as dominant 
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policy objectives. Prior to them, price stability has to 
be ensured, incentives for investment and 
international competitive efficiency have to be 
re-established, and other so-called structural 
adjustments have to be made. 
Unlike the Keynesian model (which sought to 
make the widespread distribution of benefits the basis 
of consensual agreement), the new approach seeks to 
underpin the working of the economy, by revitalizing 
profits and private capital formation, i.e., by 
submitting to the discipline of the market -without 
cushioning by the State- the rest of the productive 
agents and, of course, workers and consumers. In the 
long run, more investment and the absorption of 
technological improvements will raise productivity 
and facilitate growth, while simplifying the 
jurisdictional purview of the State will prevent the 
reappearance of excessive demands. 
From a political viewpoint, it is a question of 
increasing the power and influence of entrepreneurial 
groups vis-à-vis other segments of society, in order to 
ensure international survival and reopen the road to or 
the hope for sustained prosperity. 
Without a doubt, the new models reflect not only 
the state of economic sciences but also the 
circumstances and political climate of the leading 
countries of the industrialized world, seeking how to 
steer their changing societies or solve their problems. 
The proliferation of interest groups may complicate 
government action, making it necessary to erect 
barriers to "excessive participation" and to the 
pressure these groups exert on the budget and 
work-load of the public sector. It is also possible that 
the increase in the trade unions' negotiating power 
may have obstructed the mechanics of the market. 
Furthermore, the subsequent advance of the welfare 
State would probably have required tax increases or 
profits lowered beyond limits acceptable, in one case, 
to taxpayers and, in the other, to the business 
community. In its turn, the internationalization of 
economies limits the benefits that can be redistributed 
in favour of workers or the population at large, and 
even forces these benefits to be reduced so as to avoid 
losing the struggle for competitiveness, except where 
those costs are offset by improved productivity. 
Hence the pressures of the world-wide race for 
technological change. 
Whatever the reasons may be for the shifting of 
models in the first world, the reality thereof obliges 
the developing nations to adjust to a new kind of 
historical discord between their reality and the 
dominant economic doctrines. Assimilating that 
discord will require in many cases enormous efforts 
and sacrifices, in the political sphere as well as in 
economic relations. In Latin America, more power 
has to be given to private entrepreneurs, despite the 
fact that democratization would rather call for 
increasing the participation of groups now only 
partially incorporated into modern life. The 
satisfaction of social demands has to be delayed even 
further, when the welfare State is still in an 
embryonic stage of development. Linkages to the 
exterior have to be strengthened when, in many cases, 
national identities are not yet consolidated. State 
intervention in production has to stop, when the 
enormous task of fully changing the direction and 
style of development is still under way. Political 
legitimation has to be sought in fields other than 
employment and growth. And furthermore, all the 
foregoing has to be achieved while protecting and 
coordinating in some way present trends, 
paradoxically inclined towards democracy and the 
modernization of political regimes. 
Reforms and readaptations in the strictly 
economic sector are not any less demanding. First, a 
higher priority is given to achieving price stability 
and the balance of payments than to expanding 
production. Second, protectionism has to be fought 
against; the structure of relative prices has to be 
changed in favour of exporters; wage hikes have to be 
held below inflation rates; legal systems favouring 
foreign investment have to be established, to the point 
of making external demand the driving force of 
economic growth. Third, the severest fiscal discipline 
must be applied and sustained at all costs -mainly by 
reducing expenditures and investments, although also 
by raising the prices of public goods and services and 
increasing indirect taxation- while progressive taxes 
are lowered; State intervention must be reduced and 
public enterprises privatized or closed, until the 
market provides the impetus for development through 
private investment. 
It is essentially a question of rapidly and 
radically changing the previous pattern of economic 
development. Private enterprise would exercise 
leadership instead of governance. The domestic 
market, which hitherto gave impetus and guidance to 
the development process, would have to be replaced 
by demand from international markets. At the same 
time, the rapid pace of change in the international 
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economy multiplies the discrepancies to be overcome 
and the adjustments to be made in Latin American 
export structures, making productive reconversion 
and incorporation into the world-wide technological 
revolution requisites for survival in external 
competition. 
In short, an extraordinary number of demands for 
reform is accumulating from both inside and outside 
the social systems of Latin America. Tensions 
overload government decision-making processes, 
obstruct the functioning of the economies and test the 
very resilience of political systems. Transferring 
responsibility for development to the market and the 
private sector demands major cultural changes. One 
such change consists of accepting trends in income 
distribution which would go against the sense of 
justice and equality as democratic values. Another 
change implies instilling in the business community a 
spirit of solidarity in the exercise of national 
responsibility, to the extent that economic power, 
unprecedented in this century, is placed in their 
hands. 
The circumstances described above are reflected 
directly in the radical change of approaches to 
economic policy. Not only are social objectives 
changed and narrowed, but other means are also 
chosen to meet them, while goals and instruments 
interchange positions. 
Real growth of production and employment are 
no longer the basic and direct purpose of policies in 
the industrialized countries. The new economic 
models consider growth to be a by-product of the 
functioning of markets. Consequently, what is now 
essential is to eliminate obstacles, guarantee 
economic freedom and give productive agents the 
freedom to develop their activities. 
If the welfare State is to be limited domestically, 
the objectives of aid to third-world development are 
likewise changed. The industrialized nations become 
more protectionist, while financing on soft terms 
granted to the periphery stagnates or is reduced. 
Moreover, the problem of the Latin American debt, 
which drains resources essential for development, 
continues unabated. Long gone are the days of 
"Not all the general goals of a nation are 
intrinsically compatible with any prevalent social 
order whatsoever. Whenever a conflict arises, we are 
obliged to choose between abandoning either the goal 
or the present order; if we choose the latter, we run 
the risk of using means which could defeat the end 
being pursued" (Lowe, 1987, p. 19). Such is the basic 
dilemma, the historical inconsistency of inserting 
oneself a fortiori into an international community 
where the standard view of the world is different in 
important aspects from the reality of the state of 
development, history and institutions of the Latin 
American nations. Certainly, if a disposition exists to 
impose the changes regardless of social costs, or if 
there is an overwhelming avalanche of world 
geopolitical forces, then any development pattern 
becomes possible, even if it is abhorrent to political 
democracy. That is what happened with the colonial 
model imposed by the conquest of Latin America, 
which destroyed the native economic systems and 
caused the downfall of the indigenous population in 
the sixteenth century. 
Truman's Point IV programme or Kennedy's Alliance 
for Progress. 
In this context, more emphasis is given to 
controlling inflation than to fighting against 
unemployment. The desire to gain credibility on the 
anti-inflationary front leads Governments to remain 
unmoved in the face of increased unemployment, 
which reach figures of 7% to 11% during the past 
decade in most of the industrialized economies. Thus 
in some cases, fiscal policy no longer makes up for 
fluctuations of supply and employment in order to set 
ceilings to the expansion of nominal demand, for the 
purpose of counteracting expansionary impulses that 
feed inflation. And, in other cases, recognition of the 
inconveniences and limitations of manipulating 
aggregate demand by fiscal policy puts an end to 
old-style government activism. To a large extent, 
the high degree of economic interdependence and 
Even in the United States, where little has been done to 
eliminate fiscal deficits, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 
establishes objectives formally necessary for correcting those 
imbalances over time (Cloud, 1989). 
Ill 
Changes in economic policy 
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particularly the very rapid integration of financial 
markets have been diminishing the autonomy of 
national policies, especially those that potentially 
claim to adhere to fiscal activism typical of the 1960s 
(Sachs, Warwick and Mckibbin, 1988; Volker et al, 
1987; Polak, 1988; Fisher, 1987). 
By eclipsing the Keynesian model, monetarism 
comes to occupy a pre-eminent place among 
government policies. On the one hand, although 
temporarily, it substitutes for fiscal policy as the 
principal means for maintaining the channel and flow 
of the economy's nominal demand, abandoning its 
traditional function of regulating exchange rates 
(Williamson and Miller, 1987). On the other hand, the 
expansion of a monetary aggregate becomes the 
supreme goal of economic policy by taking it to be 
determinant, or at least univocally linked to the rate 
of expansion of nominal aggregate demand. 
Economiste reduction of social goals reaches its 
most complete expression when the regulation of the 
money in circulation either alone or together with 
financial time-deposits becomes the social goal/w 
excellence. The nineteenth century values of 
spreading and enhancing political freedoms and 
individual rights and the twentieth century values of 
full employment, growth and social rights are thus 
laid to rest. Is it any wonder that economic policy is 
losing its popular legitimating force in our time? 
In relation to managing the balance of payments 
immediately after the Bretton Woods system (1972) 
was abandoned, exchange-rate stability ceased to be 
an objective of economic policy and became an 
instrument to adjust the effects of monetary policy. 
Indeed, when the expansion of a monetary aggregate 
was raised to the category of a goal, floating 
exchange rates had to be adopted as a means to 
eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit. 
However, in the face of the resulting violent 
fluctuations in parities and interest rates, monetarist 
absolutism soon had to pull in its reins. Today, 
monetarist policy, according to some, should recover 
the function of limiting the swings in the exchange 
rate and help to control aggregate demand. In that 
way exchange-rate movements would cease to 
validate the domestic inflation of countries, forcing 
them to use other economic-policy instruments to 
control inflation instead of simply adapting to it. 
There are also those who reject the idea of using 
nominal anchors for stabilizing exchange rates as a 
guideline for monetary policy, in so far as they think 
that international trade is determined by the real 
magnitude of transactions. 
The controversy remains unresolved. In practice, 
however, the industrialized countries' central banks 
have taken an intermediate road: without setting 
precise goals for stabilizing exchange rates, they have 
tried to bring exchange markets and interest rates to 
order through ad hoc intervention, with ample 
coordination between countries, which should also 
produce stability in the international financial 
system. 
On the other hand, the centres unanimously agree 
that income policies -the consensual or forced 
management of the wages of certain productive 
agents- should be eliminated as an instrument for 
fighting inflation. The perception is that the use of 
income policies could create a lack of flexibility in 
the medium and long term by politicizing the 
economy and reducing the free market's area of 
influence. 
Important changes are also taking place at the 
micro-economic level. The most significant structural 
change is designed to intensify competition in the 
market-place and reduce the State's share in value 
added. The deregulation of economic activity, 
including the financial sector, the privatization of 
State enterprises, the benign fiscal treatment of profits 
and reinvestment, and the reduction of the trade 
unions' power are all part of a set of measures that 
seek to increase efficiency, lower costs and reinforce 
incentives for private-capital formation. 
These are the main elements of the structural 
reform put into effect in the early 1980s with different 
ranges and results in the industrialized countries, as 
the way to encourage production and producers, 
without recurring to the fiscal stimuli of demand that 
were so important in the Keynesian model. 
In general, the main doctrinal trends in vogue 
downgrade government action to guide devel-
opment, raise growth rates or provide employment for 
the work-force. Monetarists hold that Governments 
cannot effectively fight the ups and downs of the 
economic cycle. Increasing either expenditures or the 
money supply can perhaps cause the economy to 
grow momentarily, but that effect passes and a 
longer-lasting inflation is left behind.4 The school of 
rational expectations is even more pessimistic. 
Indeed, it holds that economic actors, when they have 
Hence the recommendation that central banks should abide 
by a rule of steady expansion of the money supply in order to 
achieve price stability and thereby ensure a favourable investment 
climate on which long-term development depends (Friedman, 
1968). 
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complete economic information, anticipate changes 
of government policies, thus cancelling their effects. 
Therefore Governments cannot change the course 
of the economy, except when they enact unexpected 
measures, but that can hardly be repeated without 
the productive agents foreseeing it. Fiscal and 
monetary policies, then, are barely strong enough to 
determine some short-term fluctuations in a long-term 
trend difficult to alter by deliberate government 
action (Lucas, 1972; Sargent and Wallace, 1983). 
Only the supply-side current, already on the wane, 
attributes a certain efficiency to economic policy for 
promoting capital formation, thereby making higher 
rates of development feasible. But those results 
depend on fiscal policy cutting welfare-State 
expenditures and increasing fiscal incentives for 
investment and saving, along with eliminating 
regulations and privatizing public activities (Gilder, 
1968; Raboy, 1982). 
In a nutshell, the dominant views are that 
government action is of little relevance as regards 
shaping economic phenomena and meeting the 
objectives of employment, growth and equity. And 
when they do admit more influence, they make it 
depend on the possibility of more generous 
compensation for the contribution of investors and 
savers vis-à-vis the rest of the population. 
Economic policy is no longer actively promoting 
employment and growth or pursuing the correlative 
goal of an increasingly more equalizing distribution 
of income. To a large extent, employment, real 
growth and national income distribution are 
adjustment variables, i.e., they adjust ex professo 
when the higher objectives of price stability or 
competition in international markets are attained. 
Therefore the elimination of income policies 
(price and wage controls) is relevant to the new 
model concerned with lowering costs and moving 
relative prices in favour of capital and exports, as well 
as reducing the negotiating power of trade unions. 
Also relevant is a fiscal policy less inclined to correct 
cyclical fluctuations and more interested in changing 
relative prices and the allocation of resources over the 
long term. 
The metamorphosis of economic policies, with 
their objectives and instruments, is also the cause and 
effect of highly important cultural changes. Economic 
well-being, i.e., development as the social goal par 
excellence, is beginning to be less important than 
improvement of the quality of life of the populations 
in the advanced nations. That is a result of the 
interaction of many social phenomena. High indices 
of material security and well-being enjoyed by 
first-world countries from the beginning of the 
post-war period, the ageing of their populations and 
recognition of the ecological limits of the planet are 
some of the many factors that explain the change over 
the long term in the value systems of the 
industrialized West, not to refer again to other factors 
of an economic nature (Inglehart, 1977). 
Even so, the doctrinal pendulum would seem to 
be about to swing timidly back towards theses that 
allow the State a more active role in economic affairs. 
At least some areas of possible agreement are 
beginning to take shape, where disparities between 
facts and theory are examined in a fresh and eclectic 
way, over-restrictive presuppositions are abandoned, 
and a more rigorous basis for some economic 
conclusions is sought. 
Of course the Keynesian belief in fine-tuning the 
economy or creating full employment through the 
easy expedient of a massive injection of public 
expenditures is disappearing. Also on the wane are 
monetarist approaches which claimed to solve 
problems of stability and even growth with 
fundamental and automatic rules for expanding the 
money supply. In contrast, there is agreement about 
the importance of the formation of expectations in 
determining the behaviour of economies, the presence 
of markets in structural disequilibrium or where open 
competition is not dominant, as well as the imperative 
need to provide much sounder micro-economic bases 
for macroeconomic designs. Even though a consensus 
is still lacking, some venture the opinion that the 
ingredients of a new neo-classical synthesis are 
beginning to take shape. State administration of the 
economy6 is combined with economic freedom at 
the micro-economic level, with incentives for 
employment and production and the removal of 
labour-market rigidities. The restriction placed on the 
In the United States, Japan and Europe, investment and 
saving have been declining in relation to the product since the 
1970s. Those highly significant behavioural changes in the 
economic agents and families probably explain a good part of the 
drop in development rates in the first world over the last 20 years 
(Agheveli el. at., 1990, and Bosworth, 1990). 
Macroeconomic management Implies guiding not only the 
levels of aggregate demand through fiscal and monetary 
instruments, but also the relative price structure of important 
variables, such as wages, exchange rates and interest rates. 
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autonomy of national policies by international 
interdependence is supposed to be solved by the 
industrialized countries coordinating their actions as a 
way of administering the world economy (Malinvaud, 
1977; Friedman, 1985; Fisher, 1988; Dornbusch, 
1990)7 With regard to development, the superiority 
of competition is maintained, but import-substitution 
practices or deliberate policies for the promotion of 
industry and trade are no longer completely 
condemned, nor are they condemned with the same 
unanimity. 
In Latin America, the new macroeconomics' lack 
of confidence in non-market solutions and the 
pressures of the economic crisis expressed in severe 
disequilibria in budgets, prices and payments have 
led to pre-eminence being given to short-term 
stabilization policies. The preferred instruments are 
fiscal adjustment and monetary restrictions, except in 
some countries where hyper-inflation made it 
necessary to use income policies. Moreover, the new 
models have become even stronger by being 
promoted simultaneously by the international 
financial institutions, bilateral aid agencies of the 
industrialized countries, and commercial banks. The 
resulting overlapping conditionality was beyond the 
resistance of Governments weakened by a severe lack 
of foreign exchange and resources. 
It is easy to infer from the above that the return to 
Keynesianísm is not only more cautious but also follows more 
conservative concepts regarding the welfare State. The 
liberalization of labour markets is seen as a necessary condition for 
reducing unemployment -beyond the natural rate- and achieving 
macroeconomic stability; the distributive effects of this 
liberalization are either ignored or considered a lesser evil. 
8
 The prudence of recent theoretical approaches leads to the 
statement that protection should not exceed comparatively low 
limits or that the more complex the systems of State intervention, 
the greater the risks of falling into accumulative errors and inviting 
the frequently distortional action of pressure groups (Krugman, 
1987). But, at the same time, they admit that when the unrealistic 
supposition of perfect competition in many international markets is 
no longer accepted, government intervention in favour of national 
enterprises may lead to better results (Helpman and Krugman, 
1989; Levy and Nolan, 1989; Pompret, 1988). 
The new paths opened up by contemporary 
economic thought and empirical analysis lead to more 
considered and cautious, less ambitious and assertive 
positions about the contribution of economic theory 
to achieving goals and formulating government 
strategies. Of course, the doctrinal crisis of economic 
science is hardly over and a new model is a long way 
off. Nevertheless, partial advances and the will to 
revise dogmas and admit different policy-setting 
viewpoints are beginning to provide interesting and 
practical theoretical contributions. 
Exchange policy, ever since the use of floating 
rates became widespread, has been used mainly as a 
valve for adjusting everything from the export sector 
to inflation. Efforts to stabilize exchange rates have 
generally been frustrated because of the extraordinary 
size of the disequilibria in payments and prices. The 
interruption of credit flows from international banks 
and the net transfer of saving to other countries either 
as debt service or capital flight directly destabilize 
exchange markets and public finance. Other factors 
are the immediate effects of opening economies to 
other countries, which will be discussed below. 
Consequently, balance-of-payments adjustments 
have been mostly recessive, by having to be based on 
cutting down imports, given the longer period needed 
to increase exportable supply and the unusual size of 
the deficit on current account. Paradoxically, despite 
all the efforts to open economies, they are in fact 
closing. 
Fiscal policy has had to concentrate on 
eliminating budget deficits and seeking domestic 
sources to finance them, owing to the lack of external 
resources. The biggest spending cuts are in State 
investment and social services. Except for 
public-service rates or prices for goods produced by 
parastatal agencies, reform efforts on the side of 
government revenues have generally been minor or 
their effects have been largely counteracted by the 
drop in growth rates of production. 
yIn relation to the product, Latin America's imports have 
fallen from 15.6% in the period 1976-1980 to 11.6% from 
1985 to 1988. 
IV 
The models as seen from Latin America 
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Thus fiscal adjustment has also had strongly 
recessive results, in so far as it blocks public-capital 
formation to a large extent, and also by demanding 
that national bank resources be preferably channelled 
to financing budget deficits, making credit for private 
enterprise less available and more expensive. Many 
social demands have been eliminated, as witnessed by 
the cuts in social expenditures, investments and real 
salaries of civil servants. Despite this, other social 
demands have arisen and perpetuate the fiscal deficit. 
The conversion of private external debt into sovereign 
risk,1 the large-scale transfer of Latin American 
savings to other countries and the high interest rates 
paid to citizens who bought government securities 
constitute expenditure items which normally 
represent 30% to 60% of central governments' 
budgets. 
With very few exceptions, the inertia of external 
and domestic debt service, the decline in growth, as 
well as other restrictive factors in each country, 
have postponed or rendered impossible the goal of 
full fiscal adjustment. The same is true for the 
balance of payments, owing to the fact that the 
reconstruction of export sectors has been slow 
because of the natural inflexibility in transferring 
resources from one sector to another, especially when 
the process of physical and human capital formation 
is weak. 
There seems to be more consolidation with 
respect to distribution, since the weight of the 
adjustment fell asymmetrically on certain social 
sectors. In almost all the countries there has been a 
decline in real wages -and their percentage of the 
product-, employment, and public outlays for social 
well-being, while rates for public services have risen 
and subsidies for mass consumption declined. Wage 
sacrifices have been relevant for raising interest rates 
and for changing relative prices in favour of 
so-called "marketable products". They have also 
been relevant for allocating the real income losses 
related to the deterioration of the terms of trade and 
the transfer abroad of savings. 
In 1982, the external public debt was half of Latin 
America's foreign debt. By 1985, it had reached 70% (ECLAC, 
1990b). 
Lower wages, apart from having social and 
political repercussions, have in some countries 
generated successive waves of impoverishment. The 
lower buying power of most of the population 
weakens market demand. Idle installed capacity raises 
unit costs, while the structure of demand is separated 
from the less flexible structure of supply. In these 
circumstances, either because of inflation in the costs 
of mass-consumption industries or because of 
excessive demand in industries that serve upper-class 
consumers, price and payment imbalances are 
worsened. This creates a need to reinforce measures 
for restricting demand which lead to repetitive cycles 
of depression. 
The same sequence of events and policies 
weakens the capital formation process, i.e., it 
postpones indispensable structural adjustment on the 
supply side. The activities most affected are precisely 
those that are not consolidated. Indeed, new activities 
are usually the easiest to remove -no created interests 
are hurt- and they run greater risks despite having 
higher priority in long-term economic change. For 
example, solving the payments bottleneck mainly 
means increasing export capacity, and that implies 
investing in increasing or diversifying production, in 
improving the physical infrastructure -transport, 
communications, ports, storage facilities- and in 
creating support services -marketing, financing, 
insurance, computer services, technology and 
training. 
The theses in vogue concerning structural change 
look to the market for solutions. A low, uniform and 
gradually descending import tariff and exchange 
policy as an instrument for balancing external 
accounts are two of the main procedures for changing 
relative prices in favour of marketable goods. 
Without denying the suitability of the goals of 
the approach described above, it has often been too 
general actually to increase exports; in other cases, it 
has proved insufficient for breaking supply 
bottlenecks, and perhaps in still others -the successful 
cases- high social costs had to be paid. 
Without a doubt, changing the relative price 
structure is the prerequisite for attracting 
entrepreneurial activity towards the export sector. 
Even so, given the congenital limitation of 
third-world resources, it is difficult to undertake the 
immediate manufacture of a broad range of new 
products for international markets with a good 
chance of succeeding. Likewise, the effective 
competitiveness of the developing countries is 
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determined not only by production costs but also by a 
series of deficiencies in infrastructure, managerial 
capacity and support services. In order to remove 
these obstacles, public investment programmes must 
effectively promote export trade, and ad hoc 
industrial policy measures must be taken to allow for 
the manufacture and marketing of specific goods that 
can enhance dynamic comparative advantages. 
Changing Latin America's external trade 
basically implies replacing the decisive role of 
exports that make intensive use of natural resources 
or labour with exports less vulnerable to decreasing 
yields and the inelasticities of world demand. It 
should be noted that vanguard activities in external 
trade -pharmaceutical, petrochemical, synthetic 
fibres, ceramics, computer and communications 
equipment, software, transport equipment- make 
intensive use of know-how and usually enjoy 
increasing yields. 
These two characteristics, together with the fact 
that many markets are oligopolistic, invalidate the full 
applicability of the analytical model of the free-
competition market. Different policy models have to 
be used, where State promotion and intervention can 
be appropriate (Helpman and Krugman, 1989; Brian, 
1989; Gilroy, 1989; Levy and Nolan, 1989; ECLAC, 
1990a). Efforts should be concentrated, therefore, on 
selectively identifying the nuclei of specialization in 
dynamic activities, and then do the same with respect 
to government support for technology, financing and 
insertion into external markets. 
In other words, in addition to general policies for 
creating a macroeconomic framework conducive to 
structural change, micro-economic policies must be 
implemented to meet specific objectives where 
greater development potential is thought to be found 
and where public and private efforts can work 
together. Limited resources, imperfect or non-existent 
markets, and restrictions attaching to stabilization 
programmes render Utopian the simultaneous attempt 
to achieve productive excellence in a multitude of 
activities and products. 
Without question, the more rapidly and radically 
protectionist measures are dismantled, the more the 
change in relative prices will benefit producers of 
marketable goods. But that in itself does not shorten 
the turnaround time of investments nor the delays in 
transferring resources between sectors. On the other 
hand, the faster the process of opening the economy, 
the more severe the loss of jobs and production, and 
the greater the immediate disequilibria in payments. 
When it is a matter of expanding, changing or 
diversifying production, demand can adjust much 
more rapidly than supply. There are also demands 
which macroeconomic policies cannot meet, when it 
is a question of specifically promoting particular 
activities, creating new comparative advantages or 
attaining productive excellence in specific areas of 
specialization. And there are conflicts or trade-offs 
between the objectives of stabilization, structural 
change and distributive equity, which oblige choosing 
combinations of them, knowing that they will have to 
be reflected in the costs of one or the other. 
If the goal is to reduce social sacrifices and the 
time needed to consolidate complex processes of 
stabilization and adjustment, the macroeconomic 
strategies will have to be accompanied by specific 
industrial policies; to lower the sights on stabilization 
efforts at times in order to facilitate an orderly change 
in supply capacity; and to accept the need to 
complement purely market solutions with State 
intervention, be it to give incentives to priority 
activities or to ensure minimums of distributive 
equity, compatible with social and political stability. 
The roots of price instability in Latin America 
are usually more complex than those of inflationary 
processes in the industrialized countries. In these 
latter countries, excessive public or private 
expenditures, external shocks or cost increases 
explain to a very large extent the emergence of 
pressures to raise prices. In Latin America, in addition 
to these factors that are often present, another series 
of inflationary factors comes into play: export trade 
poorly adapted to the structure of world demand11 
-which creates chronic exchange-rate tensions; the 
abrupt interruption of the flows of external savings 
-which raises interest rates tremendously; the rise in 
unit costs due to the increase of idle capacity -a 
product of the downward slope of demand and the 
enormous distributive adjustments that have been 
taking place; and unresolved distributive struggles, 
exacerbated by the unequal distribution of the 
adjustment costs. 
According to data from ECLAC, Latin America's share in 
the value of world exports Cell by 50% between 1950 and 1980; 
a trend which has not been corrected despite recent efforts, as can 
be seen by the fact that it was further reduced from 5.5% in 1980 
to 3.8% in 1989. 
78 CEPAL REVIEW No. 42 ¡December 1990 
Fiscal policy has been incapable of fulfilling its 
normal functions and serving at the same time the 
external and domestic debt. Thus Governments have 
been forced to loosen the reins on expenditures or 
cease to invest in physical or human capital 
formation. Disequilibria in payments, in turn, exert 
pressure on the exchange market and distort 
expectations, feeding primary price rises which then 
make exchange adjustments necessary. That process, 
barely outlined here, obstructs private and public 
investments that could solve the lack of exports, 
efficiently substitute for purchases abroad or improve 
the competitive capacity of countries; and what 
happens with physical investments also takes place 
with human capital formation, as shown by the 
downward impact of the adjustment on social 
expenditures, wages and unemployment. 
For that reason, inflation in Latin America is far 
from controlled, as witness the fact that it reached 
record figures of 1000% in 1989. Orthodox stabiliza-
tion programmes can to a certain extent attenuate 
inflationary spirals, but at the cost of stagnation. And 
when discipline is relaxed or production expands, 
they return with more virulence. That explains why 
instruments are used which have been discarded in 
the industrial centres, such as income policies. That 
particular instrument, together with the conclusion of 
corporativist pacts, has been used to hold down 
inertial inflation and potentially could put distributive 
effects of adjustment and stabilization programmes in 
order. 
12 
In Latin America from 1980 to 1987, overt unemployment 
increased by 16%, modern-sector employment practically 
stagnated, average wage earnings plummeted by 27.9%; real 
minimum wages deteriorated by more than 10%; social 
expenditures, except In Honduras and Trinidad and Tobago, 
dropped in relation to government expenditures and the product 
(ECLAC, 1989a and PREALC/1LO, 1988), while the population 
with incomes below the poverty line grew from a third to around 
40% of the total during the first half of the 1980s (Garcia et al, 
1988). 
In essence, the combination of orthodox 
stabilization policies and open-trade policies, even 
though it incorporates objectives of unquestionable 
priority, appears after a decade of experimentation to 
be insufficient for ending inflation or promoting 
rapid structural change in Latin America's external 
trade and production. That very same combination of 
policies has had markedly adverse effects on income 
distribution by not including explicit goals to protect 
distributive equity (Bourquinon et al, 1989). 
The other structural ingredient of the economic 
strategies of many Latin American countries has led 
fiscal adjustment to incorporate the transfer of many 
public functions to the market. Equalizing public 
expenditures with actual revenues is undoubtedly a 
sine qua non ingredient in the fight against 
inflationary tensions. Likewise, many countries in the 
region have clearly excessive economic regulations, 
and over-extension of the public sector into areas of 
direct production is also common, hardly consistent 
with present and future priorities for changing 
productive facilities. 
The critique of State intervention has its merits. 
But there are also ideological excesses that lead to 
condemning any government interference as misled, 
as if market shortcomings, distributive disparities and 
underdevelopment gaps had suddenly disappeared. 
Privatizing State enterprises and deregulation are 
usually considered the procedures for depoliticizing 
economic processes. Nothing is more misleading, in 
so far as it involves changing social objectives and 
because political interaction with civil society 
-except in dictatorships- is an obligatory ingredient 
for administering economies (Singh, 1989). For this 
reason, the combination of fiscal crisis with 
ideologized processes of transferring the functions of 
the State to the market at all costs, can erode 
government capacity to guide development and 
protect fundamental social rights. 
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V 
Regulation and privatization 
Economic regulation and State participation in 
production are phenomena characteristic of modern 
societies. Although there are differences of degrees, 
both imply the organization of government action to 
influence, direct or control the conduct of productive 
agents and citizens. The very existence of market 
institutions depends on the force of regulation and the 
adoption of specific organizational forms guaranteed 
by the State. Once the market system is established, 
regulatory measures originate from the need to 
correct the undesirable effects of its functioning and 
to complement it where it functions inadequately. 
The fashionable model has reinforced the thesis 
that State intervention should be evaluated basically 
by market criteria. The criterion of economic 
efficiency alone -in part for being relatively new in 
steering public policy- explains, however, little of the 
history of government intervention. In reality, the 
presence of the State in the economic sector has been 
up till now more for social reasons than for 
calculations of productivity. The establishment or 
defence of individual and social rights, protection of 
human life, the correction of distributive biases, the 
supply of public goods, or simply the healing of 
divisions within civil society have been so many other 
objectives of State intervention. In the third world, the 
urgency of closing the underdevelopment gap has 
made it important to create other areas of government 
action. The most frequent cases are those protecting 
nascent industries or State investment in the 
production of goods considered to be strategic, when 
private enterprise, either because of weakness or 
because of high risks involved, does not have the 
capacity to give them impetus with appropriate speed 
or direction. 
State intervention or the suppression thereof 
always has a regulatory character, in so far as it seeks 
to meet needs of the community. Limiting the abuses 
of monopoly or promoting economic efficiency are 
other goals, which, when opted for, involve an 
inevitable hierarchy of values. Therefore, it is a 
typically political -not technical- process, where the 
choice of objectives depends, in the last instance, on 
the array of social forces, the more influential 
ideologies, and the history and particular needs of 
each country. 
Hence the characteristic features of State 
intervention and the boundaries between the public 
and private sectors vary enormously from nation to 
nation, resisting purely technical explanations. Today, 
however, in the face of the twofold onslaught of new 
models and bitter international competition -plus the 
economic crisis in the case of Latin America- a 
certain convergence is taking shape in the styles of 
State intervention. Even so, significant differences 
subsist and will subsist, arising from the different 
problems and institutional political environments 
existing between countries. 
Historically, State intervention in advanced 
economies has had characteristics unlike those in 
developing economies. In the advanced economies, 
direct State participation in production is less frequent 
-there are no left-over gaps to fill- and the needs 
related to welfare-State institutions and military 
defence are much greater. The contrary is true of the 
developing economies, in so far as the promotion of 
new production and wealth has had primacy over any 
other objective, at least in the last half century, 
although excesses have certainly taken place in 
military expenditures. 
Distinctions in meaning can also be made in the 
case of regulation. In the industrialized nations, 
regulation up to the end of the 1950s was 
predominantly concerned with questions of tax 
reform and redistribution, the system of competition, 
free entry into different industries, or price control. 
Beginning with the 1960s, regulatory efforts changed 
course in pursuit of objectives of public interest, such 
as environmental protection, the quality of consumer 
goods, the end of discrimination in the work-place, 
highway safety, or rules of conduct to be followed by 
the participants in some markets. Hence the intense 
proliferation of social regulation institutions over the 
last two decades have generated costs for productive 
activities and responded more to general interests of 
the population than to the demands of producers. 
This explains the rise of resistance, especially when 
intense international competition is reducing the room 
The number of regulatory agencies in the United States 
doubled between 1960 and 1980, and the federal budget for 
those agencies trebled during the 1970s, with regulatory costs 
estimated to be a maximum -probably exaggerated- of US$200 
billion a year (Penoyer, 1981; Breyer, 1982). 
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for manoeuvre and profits in a growing number of 
activities.14 The basic question begins to reflect 
tensions between opposite social goals. A better 
quality of life -more leisure, environmental 
protection, economic security- which the populations 
of the first world demand with different degrees of 
intensity, generates costs and limits the capacty for 
international competition -another main objective-
with newly industrialized countries, whose social 
aspirations are more modest. 
In the developing countries, regulation has 
lagged behind in many aspects and taken on some 
trends of its own. Both phenomena are partially 
rooted in the different circumstances in which these 
nations move. Their frequently small markets and 
meagre industrial diversification have limited the 
scope of antimonopolistic regulation. Environmental 
protection and quality control of consumer goods 
have had to be modified owing to budget limitations, 
1. Privatization 
The welfare State's long period of growth in the first 
world, plus the explosion of regulations for 
public-interest purposes that began in the 1960s, 
created fiscal tensions and tensions among interest 
groups, which led to major changes in the policies 
and ideologies that support them. There were at issue 
here not only a natural resistance to paying taxes and 
the consequent disincentives to invest, save and work, 
or the proliferation of contradictory social demands, 
but also the generation of higher costs, which placed 
the enterprises of several industrialized countries in a 
situation of inferiority in international markets. 
Those ideological trends have found fertile 
ground in the third world. Fiscal deficits had reached 
the level of 6% to 15% of the product since the 1970s, 
as a result of governments' attempts to compensate 
for the depressive effects of the decline of external 
demand and the deterioration of the terms of trade, oil 
shocks, the rise in interest rates and the interruption of 
14
 Previous economic regulation was not always resisted; it 
favoured different entrepreneurial segments. At times, it protects 
producers from the excesses of competition; at other times, it aims 
to eliminate market defects and at stitl other times, to Improve 
the information available to productive agents. 
the need to meet other basic needs, and the 
insufficient supply of products with better 
specifications. 
In contrast, import-substitution strategies and the 
defence of national entrepreneurs greatly increased 
the body of regulations relating to external trade and 
foreign investment in Latin America, as well as the 
investment of development banks and financial 
institutions responsible for administratively allocating 
credit to the benefit of national priorities. In the same 
way, the hope of making macroeconomic stability 
compatible with the structural change of supply led at 
different times to the proliferation of exchange and 
price controls, and more recently, to the 
implementation of income policies. Finally, the 
protection of e ssential consumer items and the need 
to direct private investment along the lines of 
industrial policy explain why many regulatory 
subsidies were granted. 
credit flows from commercial banks. At first, 
attempts were made to postpone the adjustment on 
the premise that the international markets would soon 
"normalize". Later, the implementation of restrictive 
adjustment and stabilization policies became 
indispensable, a trend reinforced by the doctrinal 
leanings of the international financial bodies and the 
development agencies of the industrialized nations. 
The main purpose of stabilization programmes is 
to correct fiscal deficits; the liberalization of external 
trade and foreign investment form part of the nucleus 
of structural reform. Consequently, privatization is 
seen as a hopeful means not only to hold down 
expenditures but also to gather additional resources 
Precisely these regulations and the institutions created to 
apply them are the ones that have to be dismantled because of the 
widespread change of strategies towards external openness, the 
broadening of market functions, and the State's decision no longer 
to satisfy with the same historical abundance the demands of many 
interest groups. Financial liberalization implies introducing organic 
changes much deeper than the simple admission of actors from 
abroad. Strictly speaking, financial liberalization would lead to 
eliminating a good part of the systems of administered allocation of 
credit, that is, to renouncing or greatly simplifying national 
priorities, granting a lesser role to development banks, government 
financial institutions, cash holdings or preferential lending 
institutions, as well as creating market Institutions for freely 
channelling savings (Zysman, 1983). 
VI 
The doctrinal debate and reality 
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through the sale of assets, in order to balance public 
accounts. Deregulation, in turn, is seen as the way to 
remove obstacles to the functioning of the market, as 
well as to end overt or covert subsidies and avoid 
excessive demands from interest groups which 
overburden government budgets. Both privatization 
and deregulation are seen as a political and economic 
way of giving entrepreneurs better incentives for 
investment and growth. Thus fiscal pressures are 
combined with doctrinal formulations to provoke a 
dramatic change in the perceptions of the State's role 
in economic affairs in Latin America. 
Even so, the principal justification of 
privatization has been not so much financial pressures 
but rather economic efficiency. It is commonly 
pointed out that private enterprise raises productivity 
in the use of resources, to the extent that ideal 
conditions of competition generate Pareto optimality. 
Even though a more or less widespread opinion on 
the inferior economic efficiency of public enterprises 
continues to exist, there is little empirical evidence to 
back it up and the explanations given differ greatly. 
According to the exponents of the property-rights 
school, government enterprises are inefficient 
because their managers do not seek to maximize the 
income or wealth of the owners (the citizens), pursue 
their own ends, and are comparatively less well paid; 
these enterprises also face excessive controls which 
reduce their scope for action and initiative (Alchian, 
1965). Others emphasize the lack of market 
competition -particularly in the case of public 
monopolies- or the poor financial discipline when 
there is automatic access to credit and it is impossible 
to go bankrupt (De Alessi, 1980; Echert, 1979). Still 
others underline the alliances between government 
bureaucracy and the directors of public enterprises to 
strengthen political influence and expand 
expenditures and investments beyond what would be 
optimum from the viewpoint of the correct allocation 
of resources (Niskanen, 1975). 
In general, critical conclusions point out that 
public enterprises tend to pursue multiple goals, 
innovate more slowly, follow price policies more 
loosely adjusted to the evolution of costs, have lower 
levels of and greater variability in profits, and invest 
at higher levels than do private enterprise. 
It is reasonable to accept that more intense 
competition tends to improve efficiency in allocating 
resources, but it is also reasonable to recognize that 
reality does not correspond entirely to the model of 
perfect competition. Monopolies, non-essentials, 
higher returns to scale, indivisibilities, and the 
production of public goods explain in practice why 
many State enterprises were created. And even 
though technological and institutional changes may 
correct the faults of the market, many of the same 
conditions persist that once justified State 
intervention in strictly economic terms. 
In a certain sense, the ideological dimension of 
the debate leads to confusing the question of private 
or government property with the problem of 
competition. Transferring a public enterprise to 
entrepreneurial hands can be simply transforming a 
public monopoly into a private one, or substituting 
complex and costly regulatory systems for controls 
inherent in direct State production. Likewise, 
competition can be increased without changing the 
property regime, especially when a policy of 
openness to other countries is in place and the 
directives and goals of public enterprises are modified 
(Thompson, 1986). Strictly speaking, more important 
than the size of the public sector is the efficacy with 
which parastatal enterprises use the resources at their 
disposition or fulfil the different objectives they are 
given (Cook, 1988). 
Resolving the debate on efficiency by 
empirically examining the behaviour of public versus 
private enterprises also does not lead to a definitive 
conclusion. The first difficulty is the fact that 
government enterprises rarely have economic 
efficiency as their only objective. Few analytical 
efforts are dedicated to determining how efficiently 
they meet their objectives. Despite that, private 
results do not always appear to be superior to public 
results either in the industrialized countries or the 
third world (Millward, 1988; Yarrow, 1986; Hanke, 
1987; Borcherding et al., 1982; Pier W. et al, 1974). 
Moreover, when public production is compared to 
private, no attention is usually given to the alternate 
costs of regulating, monitoring and controlling private 
production when there is a monopoly or other market 
defects, as well as costs for meeting redistributive 
goals without using State enterprises (Borcherding 
et al, 1982). 
In any case, the old consensus on the impact of 
public enterprises on development is clearly gone. 
Only slightly more than a decade ago it was thought 
that direct government investment not only 
contributed to fulfilling economic plans but also made 
it possible to enter strategic sectors, create external 
economies and make up for the deficiencies among 
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entrepreneurs or in capital markets (Nurkse, 1959; 
Prebisch, 1952; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). That 
explained actions from the creation of development 
banks to the formation of enterprises in the basic 
sectors of the economy (energy, steel, capital goods, 
transport). 
Today, the validity of development theory and 
the very need of an industrial policy to close the gap, 
and of course, the wisdom of the welfare State are 
all questioned. The task of industrial policy in the 
neo-classical framework is to change the allocation of 
resources between industries so as to make them more 
efficient and attract positive non-essentials. Put that 
way, the State would appear to have no particular 
advantage for accomplishing that task over the market 
and private agents. Even so, the circumscriptive 
criterion of efficiency in the use of resources does not 
adequately explain the designs of industrial policy 
that most countries have been putting into practice. 
In fact, industrial development has sought not 
static efficiency but the creation and consolidation of 
activities that generate employment, exports, high 
value-added products or the manufacture of widely 
used inputs. Thus industrial policies reflect the 
political need to correct the market and cater to values 
or attain different social objectives. The presumed 
inefficiency in the resulting allocation of resources is 
proved by the failures of some countries and refuted 
by the experience of others. The history of East Asia 
would seem to validate the thesis of the compatibility 
between State intervention and rapid processes of 
productive modernization and growth. Also, in 
most Latin American countries, gross domestic 
product enjoyed its highest growth during the period 
when government activism was strongest. 
Richard Caves refers to industrial policy as a category 
of measures in search of an analytical frame of reference oras 
a political slogan in search of respectability (Caves, 1986). 
Hirschman thinks that development economics, after the important 
advances of the 1950s and 1960s, has entered a phase of decline. 
He attributes this to the fact that it is a discipline born of distinct 
ideological currents with internal tensions that have turned out to 
be destructive. And also to the fact that it creates exaggerated 
expectations, which, when they are not met, cause disillusionment 
and frustration (Hirschman, 1981). 
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 Japan and then Korea, together with other Asian countries, 
raised and still maintain protectionist barriers and schemes to 
promote select Industries, which has not led to inefficiencies or a 
weakening of the spirit of entrepreneurial innovation (Zysman, 
1983; Helpman, 1989; Levy, 1989). 
The virtues of privatization have been 
exaggerated in more than one regard. Frequently 
corporate change is difficult to achieve, budgetary 
benefits are meagre and the political costs are high. In 
particular, social and distributive objectives are 
customarily assigned to public enterprises; these 
would have to be sacrificed as incompatible with 
private entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Even so, it cannot be denied that at the present 
time numerous cases exist in which the deficits of 
public enterprises excessively drain the fiscal coffers, 
especially when these enterprises have to respond to 
new demands for expenditures related to servicing the 
external and domestic debt, as well as the change in 
relative prices in favour of exporters. However, these 
cases would have to be rigorously examined to see if 
it is a question of inefficiencies properly speaking -a 
comparatively greater use of physical inputs- or 
forms of subsidizing and meeting other government 
objectives. 
It is highly probable that the fiscal crisis and the 
intensification of external competition make 
economic efficiency more important as an objective. 
There is a risk, however, in reducing social 
objectives, in the sense of subjecting everything to the 
achievement of an economic goal that is in itself 
narrow. 
It is also risky to base privatization policies on 
the needs of short-term public finances. If the State 
sells enterprises which have a strategic function for 
development or social equity, owing to shortages of 
liquidity, it would be sacrificing an important element 
for meeting urgent needs. Moreover, if the sources of 
financing are domestic, instruments of monetary 
policy will enable any government to obtain the same 
resources through credit. Indeed, if the sales are to be 
equitable, the present value of the future flow of net 
revenues of the enterprise should be approximately 
equal to its selling price and correspond to the market 
interest rate. In terms of monetary flows, the effects 
of a sale or a loan would be analogous, although the 
distribution of the funds from the transactions among 
the saving population would vary (Vernon, 1988, a 
and b). 
Stated plainly, if profitable enterprises are sold, 
fiscal imbalance will increase in time. Naturally, if 
revenues obtained in that way are used to reduce 
government indebtedness, the fiscal imbalance would 
not be adversely affected; but then little or nothing 
would have been gained or lost, given the normal 
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differential between the rate of profit and the rate of 
interest. And if enterprises in the red are sold, the 
rational buyer would have to obtain the compensation 
of receiving deliberately undervalued assets and the 
right to raise prices in the future to match 
expenditures with revenues, apart from the advances 
he might make in raising productivity. That is 
precisely what explains why, when enterprises are 
privatized, prices rise or the covert or overt subsidies 
given by the public enterprises are revoked. 
Obtaining other results would presuppose that the 
State sells above or below the market value of the 
enterprises to be privatized. 
It has to be admitted that the presence of defects 
in the market could justify reservations about what is 
said in the previous paragraph. In industrialized 
countries with large capital markets, privatization can 
take place simply by selling snares on stock 
exchanges. However, in many developing economies, 
the privatization of enterprises involves slower and 
more complex processes in order to sell them as 
complete productive units (Cook, 1988). 
Even so, privatization can be financed by 
repatriating capital or attracting foreign investments, 
where foreign credit sources are non-existent or very 
restricted. In that case, the sale of public enterprises 
could well mean a temporary relief in fiscal 
maladjustments and those of payments, depending on 
how the resources thus obtained are used. 
Except for special cases, privatization usually has 
less of a macroeconomic scope. Few enterprises are 
large enough to affect overall economic behaviour or 
completely solve budgetary imbalances (ECLAC, 
1989b). Moreover, the fact that State enterprises are 
only sold once and in naturally slow processes lessens 
the macroeconomic effects even more. 
The transfer of enterprises to the private sector 
may increase economic efficiency in the static sense. 
The entrepreneur is undoubtedly less inclined to 
subsidize or meet social objectives and is rarely 
disposed to absorb losses year after year. It is also 
true that the sales would lighten the administrative 
burden of the State. Even so, there are costs that 
affect or can affect the development momentum, 
especially in third-world countries. Managerial or 
administrative talent is generally scarce. This affects 
the private sector as well as the State. Likewise, 
private financial resources are limited and there are 
18
 IE the aim was to revoke those subsidies in order to lessen 
fiscal pressures, more direct means would exist for doing so. 
inevitable trade-offs between investing them in 
purchases of State enterprises or undertaking new 
productions which would support the transformation 
of productive structures. Consequently, the massive 
sale of public enterprises -when that takes place-
even though it has immediate fiscal effects, can in the 
medium term tie down financial resources and 
entrepreneurial capacity in predominantly obsolete 
activities which are by definition no longer, or in the 
process of ceasing to be, strategic for building the 
economy of the future. 
Perhaps the restrictions mentioned can be 
avoided in some cases by means of direct foreign 
investment. As a general solution, however, foreign 
investment would produce well-known unfortunate 
effects in the economic order, if not also in the 
institutional and political order. 
In any case, the most notable effect of 
privatization and deregulation is to encourage the 
consolidation of social agreements, through which the 
role and power of entrepreneurs in the economy are 
increased. For this reason, and to coincide with the 
dominant doctrinal theses in the Western world, those 
processes usually reinforce the business community's 
confidence in government policies, with direct effects 
-hopefully- on the stability of the exchange markets 
and, together with other factors, on the private 
propensity for capital formation. 
2. Deregulation 
The ideological debate on deregulation occurs again 
between those who want to broaden the domain of the 
market and those who are concerned about preserving 
intact the realm of public action or, what amounts to 
the same thing, the tension between economic 
freedoms for private production and the social need to 
limit those freedoms in order to meet goals of a 
different kind. 
Other doctrines have arisen in opposition to the 
traditional thesis that regulation is the answer for the 
defects of the market and protects public interests 
(Wilson, 1980). According to some of these doctrines, 
regulatory agencies are born as enterprises, 
legislatures, political parties or factions, or come to 
be dominated by the groups to be regulated or 
interest groups (Stigler, 1971; Mazmanian, 1980). 
This gives rise to rents, i.e., highly concentrated 
benefits which are the incentive for covering the costs 
of lobbying and the political struggles involved in 
obtaining ad hoc regulatory statutes. 
